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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001356

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/C, DS/C/PSP, DS/IP AND DS/IP/AF

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SUBJECT: KINSHASA - GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 151051

Classified By: RSO JEFF LISCHKE. REASON 1.4 (G).

1. (U) The following from RSO are Kinshasa's responses to reftel subparagraphs A-L:

A. (C) Physical Security Upgrades - Official Facilities:  
(2) Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated to mitigate vulnerabilities. Kinshasa completed a major physical security upgrade project at the Chancery and the Joint Administrative Office (JAO) in April of 2002 which greatly improved the physical security at both compounds. With the involvement of the Ambassador, we also received permission to close off Dongo Street which runs along the west side of the Chancery and Avenue des Aviateurs which is the street located directly in front of the Chancery. Our most vulnerable point is the south-east portion of the Chancery where Avenue des Aviateurs passes in front of the Portuguese Embassy and then within 8 feet of the perimeter wall and 20 feet of the Embassy building. The Ambassador, DCM and RSO met with the mayor of Kinshasa on several occasions and requested permission to close off this portion of Aviateurs with negative results. Before approaching the Mayor of Kinshasa, we received approval from the Portuguese to close off Ave. des Aviateurs in front of their Embassy and have a shared vehicle control point. However, without permission from the local government we are unable to do this. Another vulnerability at the Chancery is the Consular Section. After the 1998 bombings and the push for co-location, the Consular Section moved from the USAID building onto the Embassy compound in early 2000 without receiving permission from DS. During an IG inspection in 2002, the number one recommendation of the IG was to renovate the Consular Section building to make it more secure and efficient. OBO provided funding but DS is holding up the funds because a waiver package to co-locate was never submitted. We recently submitted the waiver package and are looking forward to a favorable response from DS so the project can move forward and address the numerous security vulnerabilities the Consular Section currently has. We also requested during the physical upgrade project to have the mechanical/hydraulic drop arm located inside the Embassy compound moved to the initial vehicle checkpoint on Dongo street but were told we could not do it. More Embassy employees park on Dongo street than inside of the compound so in our opinion it makes much more sense to have the mechanical barrier located on Dongo street and the manual one located inside the Embassy compound.

(C) The JAO compound, located approximately .8 kms west of the Embassy, is relatively secure but does not meet the setback requirement in the south and south-west portion of the main building. All administrative functions of the Embassy are located at JAO - Admin, B&F, GSO, FM, Motor Pool, etc. The Public Affairs Library also does not meet the setback standard. The CAC's and vehicle checkpoints meet DS standards and we feel relatively good about the security at JAO other than the lack of setback issue.

(C) The USAID compound is located .4 kms from the Embassy in a commercial office space that also has 7 apartments. USAID completed a major physical security upgrade project in the spring of 2003 and installed DS standard drop arms and guard booths. We also installed cement planters that increased the setback from approximately 30 feet to 60 feet from the main street. One of the most noticeable and disturbing vulnerabilities of the USAID building is the uncontrolled access to a junk yard/mechanic shop located directly behind the facility on the eastern side. USAID has also grown substantially. In July of 2001 there were 5 direct hire American employees. Now there are 16. The Center of Disease Control also moved into this building in the winter of 2002 and they have 2 American direct hire staff. The bottom line is that USAID and CDC will run out of office space if they continue to expand.

(C) Other than the Consular Section renovation project, we do not have any other physical security upgrade projects planned in the near future. The only way to improve the security at all three locations would be to close more streets which the Congolese Government will not permit us to do. The good news is that we just located a parcel of land and received permission from the Department to sign an option

to buy contract with the owner for a proposed New Embassy Compound (NEC) project that is supposed to start in 2008. Unless we received permission to

**1B. (C) Chemical/Biological Protection:** Program is necessary element of the overall RSO security program at post but is ineffective and requires improvement. We still have not received First Responder training. It has been scheduled several times in the past, but has always been canceled. That said, we do feel that the threat of a chem/bio attack in Kinshasa is low but would still like to receive the training. Our APO facility can be sealed in the event of a chem/bio incident and we are looking forward to receiving the Quick Mask 2000.

**1C. (C) Technical Security Upgrades:** Program is highly relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important vulnerabilities. As a result of the major physical security upgrade project completed in April 2002, we have excellent CCTV coverage at the Chancery, JAO and USAID with Intellex capability at all except USAID where the video recorder and tapes are being utilized. We have hard-wired and remote IDNS capability at both the Chancery and JAO but nothing at USAID in spite of several requests to USAID Security to address this issue.

**1D. (U) Armored Vehicle Program:** Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate important vulnerabilities. In a post like Kinshasa and as events of the recent coup and student/population demonstrations proved, lightly and fully armored vehicles are a necessity. During the recent student demonstrations, several of the Embassy LAV's were struck with rocks, bottles, etc. and did not suffer any damage. We currently have a fully armored Suburban for the COM and 10 LAV Suburbans. We do believe that Toyota Landcruisers would be a better option in Kinshasa because of the reliability, availability of spare parts and fuel consumption.

**1E. (U) Guard Programs:** Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate vulnerabilities. Our contract guard service provided by USDS is excellent in spite of the low salaries paid to the guards. As anyone who has served at an Embassy is well aware, the local guards are our first line of defense and play a critical role in the security of both facilities and residences. The problem is that guards are usually woefully underpaid and receive minimal medical and retirement benefits by the guard contract companies because they want to maximize their profit margins. I have always been a strong advocate of a FSN/LES guard force where the guards work directly for the Embassy so we can guarantee a basic salary that is paid on time and ensure that the guards receive adequate family medical benefits which is paramount for their morale. How can we expect a guard to be loyal to the Embassy and give up his life if he feels he is underpaid, receive limited medical benefits and are not respected? Additionally, guards in a post like Kinshasa (and many others in Africa), they cannot comprehend the fact that they do not work for the Embassy but rather for a company that has a contract with the Embassy.

**1F. (U) Surveillance Detection Program:** Program is highly relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important vulnerabilities. Our SD program is effective and we feel that it should continue.

**1G. (U) Residential Security:** Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate vulnerabilities. Residential security is critical in Kinshasa. All residences have safehavens alarms that are connected to a Central Alarm Monitoring System (CAMS), grills on all windows and doors that are reasonably accessible, good perimeter security lighting, a perimeter wall with concertina/razor wire and 24-hour guards. As a result, we have not experienced one residential break in for several years. I am not sure whether or not SRWF is required for all residences. It is necessary for key officers' residences, but I do not believe that SRWF is necessary on every single residential window. That said, the majority of our residences have SRWF and those that do not will have it installed.

**1H. (U) Soft Targets:** Program is highly relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important vulnerabilities. I have worked closely with the Administrator from The American School of Kinshasa (TASOK) to ensure that we took advantage of the funding offered by the Department for the different phases of the security upgrade programs at Overseas American Schools. TASOK now has a PA system that enables the Administrator to give emergency instructions to students throughout the campus and the class rooms, a 25 watt mobil radio that enables him to communicate effectively with Post # 1 and SRWF on the majority of class room and office windows. Most recently, we requested and received \$70,000.00 to improve the perimeter wall and place concertina/razor wire on the entire wall.

(U) We do have an issue with security at the Congo American Language Institute. We would like to improve their security by adding hard-line doors, a proper screening area and some other security upgrades but are having a problem with funding. Is PD or DS responsible for providing funding? Please note that there are no Americans who work at the facility, but we consider it a soft target.

I. (U) Briefing Program: Program is highly relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important vulnerabilities. We have an excellent briefing program for permanent and TDY American personnel, FSN/LES staff and the private American community. We included the checklist sent by the DS as a result of the Larry Foley Accountability Review Board in our briefing. We regularly give security advice to Embassy personnel at our All American Staff meeting that is held every other Friday. We also brief members of the private American community at Town Hall meetings held at the Ambassador's residence. We also provide newly hired FSN/LES with a security/CI briefings.

J. (U) ATA Program: Program is a necessary element of the overall RSO security program at post, but is ineffective and requires improvement. It has been my experience as RSO that unless the country you are serving in is on the foreign policy map - Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, etc. - there is no opportunity to take advantage of this incredible program. I have, however, worked closely with our Public Affairs Officer and sent several Congolese Police and Security Officials back to the States under the International Visitors (IV) Program.

K. (U) Emergency Management Program: Program is highly relevant, operating effectively, well supported and mitigates important vulnerabilities. In a post like Kinshasa that has been evacuated 5 times in the last 10 years, emergency planning is paramount. I provide a briefing to all pertinent members of the Embassy on their responsibilities in the event of an evacuation. The CLO and I recently held a briefing for all Embassy and USAID employees and their dependents on what to expect in the event of an evacuation. Additionally, the Crisis Management Exercise (CME) conducted by the Department also helps prepare Embassies for crisis situations. One comment on the EAP: DS/SPP needs to clarify the incorporation of the Section 1500 completed by the Integrated Survey Teams and with what the Section 1500 is supposed to have.

L. (U) RSO and RSO/IS Training: Program is necessary, generally effective, can be updated to better mitigate vulnerabilities. Both of the ARSO's serving in Kinshasa arrived well-trained and ready to handle the challenges a post like Kinshasa offers. That said, there is not much opportunity for a RSO who has been in the field for 2-3 posts to receive any RSO/IS training.

2. (U) POC is RSO Jeff Lischke at 243-81-88-44608 (cell) or 934 ext. 2207 (IVG).

SCOTT